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FEATURES

Client Confidences and Public Confidence inthe Legal Profession:
Observations on the ABA House of Delegates Deliberations
on the Duty of Confidentiality
Irma S.R s. tll*
n August 2001 and February 2002, the American Bar
Association H1ouse of Delegates debated the merits of
proposed amendments to the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct,' completing their work to
update the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, with
the exception of the roles relating to multijurisdictional
practice and the unauthorized practice of law.' The ABA
Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Etics 2000 Commission") proposed revisions to

the Model Rules;3 after four years of study.
During
that time,ate
the foryersion
Commission sur.
stirdringthatimels

to reject any proposals to revert back to the former rule. In
support of these goals, I set fbrth the points I would have
presented at Chicago, urging the delegates to: (1) beware of
absolutes and consider proportionality, (2) recognize
lawyers as trustworthy decision makers, and (3) acknowledge the profession's responsibility iothe public.
(1) BEWARE OF ABSOLUTES
AND CONSIDER
PROPORTIONALITY

01P

On this first point, it is important to note
that the duty or confidentiality is one of the
bedrock principles ollthe legal protesston. It
veyed lawyers and scholars, reviewed forarticulates the foutlatiotal duty of lawvyers
Proportionality is
mal opinions by the ABA Standing
to protect client inflonnation. Wlile it is
of the rule of lawv,
Committee on Ethics and Professional
undoubtedly one of the must impottait
Responsibility and opinions from state
that lawyers owe to their clients, it
.duties
.
disciplinary hoards, conducted hearings
has not traditionally been regarded as an
'.-2,,
regarding theModel Rules, and drafted its L 4
proposed revisions to the Model Rules.
absolute.' Those who argue that the duty of
conidentiality should be revered as an absolute value of our
The amendments debated included prop.sd exceptions
profession fail
to take into account two important qualifiers.
-

' ,F

"

a hallmark principle

to toe pronuiinon against4 revealing client inionmaioi set
forth in Model Rule 1.6. The House accepted significant
remedial changes, authorizing permissive disclosure when
necessary to prevent "reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm." 5 to "secure legal advice" about conpliance with the Model Rules, and to comply with "other law
or it court order" The House also retained the provision of
the rile that allows lawyers to disclose client information
"to establish a claim or dctL'nse on beliall of the lawyer."
While the significance of thcsc changes should not be
underestimated, the I louse also rejected some important and

beneficial changes proposed by the Commission.
As one of several individuals that the Ethics 2000
Commission asked to testify in support of its proposal to
change Model Rule 1.6, I traveled to Chicago and waited to
speak. I did not speak to the House because delegates
"called the question," obtaining avote on an amendment to
delete subsection (.b)(2) flona the proposed revision to
Model Rule 1.6.6 1 wrile now to commend both the ABA
I louse of Delegates and the Ethics 2000 Commission on the
important accomplishment they have achieved in the
process of revising the rules and, additionally, to encourage
the I louse to reconsider the proposed (b)(2) and (b)(3) and

First, the general principle of proportionality often
requires the use of meaningful exceptions to balance the
interests at issue in any given doctrine. Proportionalily is a
hallmark principle of the rule of law. After all, cven the First
Atendment to the Constitution is not absolute. It allows for
exceptions, limiting speech to respond to situations of peril.$
By aiending Rule 1.6 to allow lawyers to disclose client
information to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harn, the House cured the most severe proportionality problem raised by the confidentiality rule.
Nevertheless, the Ilouse's rejection of limited exceptions to
protect third parties and the public in regard to financial and
property interests raises serious questions of proportionality
and the lawyer's role in society, particularly because the proposed exceptions limit disclosures to situations in which a
client used the lawyer's services to commit a crime or fraud.
Specifically, the deletion of the Commission's proposed
subsection (b)(2) at the August meeting presents a partial
triumph ofan absolulist view otconlidentiality. This provision would have permilted the disclosure of client intormation by lawyers "'to prevent the client [ruim committing a
crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interest or property orl another" when the client used the lawyer's services to further tie
crime or fraud. After the defeat of subsection (b)(2), the
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Commission withdrew proposed subsection (b)(3), which
would have permitted lawyers to disclose client information
to "mitigate, or rectily substantial injury" in the same circunstances of use of lawyer scrviccs to further the crime or
fraud. The defbal and withdnwal of these proposed exceptions sustains a system that leaves third parties and the publieat risk of significant harm from represented individuals
9
who intend harm or act recklessly.
By contrast, the current exceptions allow lawyers to
speak to protect their own interests, to "establish a claim or
defense," without regard to the strength of tile interest or the
nature of the threat. The claim or defense asserted need not
be of any pat ticular value: a $5.00 fle meets the test as well
as a $5 million fee. This liberal exception for lawyer selfinterest is in sharp contrst to the I louse's rejection of tle
limited protection for third parties and the public,'O even
where the interests at stake tire substantial. For example,
neither the loss of the family farm nor significant property
damage caused by an intentional release of hazardous substances is sufficient to trigger protection for third parties.
Moreover, Enron employees, who lost
millions of dollars in pensions, lack pro- ppim
tection under this rule, though protection
of the lawyer's fee, no matter how small,
is sufficient to allow disclosure.

'i4d

Knowles outline the history of the profession's abandonment of the tradi tional link betwcen confidentiality and tIle
crime-fraud exc option to the atttnrncy-client privilege and
urge recognition ofa pennissive disclosure applicable lo the
crinie-fraud silu alion in order to "rcinrorce[] the lawyer's
duty to provide only lawful assistance and ads ice to
clienls."14 They make explicit the policy relationshtip
between confide ntiality and the exception to the privilege.
11P1
..
Inc very policies and purposes that justify the
professional dLuty of confidentiality in the first place
argue strongly'for a permissive exception to that duty
cotreslnding to the clietit-fraud exception of the
attorney-clien t privilege. Ifa lawyer is required to testit ' to a Clen t comnticaton, otherwise privileged,
when the clioi it has sought the lawyer's advice and services to perpe trate or continue a fraud, a concomitant
discretion to lisclose without lestimonial compulsion
should be rec ogniied under the professional duty of
confidentialit i. Neither the legal profession nor society
should tolerate a regime in which lawyers
a
is iwhole
may be used by clients as a means of
5
carrying out a crime or fraud."'
.:O

The Model Rules provide that the question of the existence of atnattorney-client
an relationship is to be delennined by referabsolutist version of confidentiality. ence to substantive law, "[Flor purposes of
The rejection and withdrawal of subseedetermining the lawyer's authority tnd
tions (2) and (3) leaves third parties and
responsibility, principles of snbstantive law
the public at risk to significant harm from
s"
external to these Rules determine whether a
.W_1.ON
U.,.1.
a lauwyer's client. It leaves lawers without
relationship
exists."I6 The applicable law
client-lawyer
discretion to reveal infoniation to prevent substantial harn
regarding the attorney-client relationship includes compothat would flow front a crime or fraud in which the client
nents of agency, fiduciary obligation, and contract aw with
used the lawyer's services. The comparison of these results
contract law predominating with regard to the relationship
offends any serious conception ofprlmportionality of law.
and the expectations of the parties relating to tie rights and
Second, the law of attorney-client privilege, including
responsibilities that inhere in the relaiotiship. While the duty
the crime-fraud exception to the privilege, may present a
otconfidentiality is a core principle of prolessional responsilegitimate limitattion on the duty of confidentiality in some
bility, it should not override substantive law or destroy tie
cases. Even an absoltte rule of confidentiality would not
application of public policy and lw to the attorney-client
protect against disclosure of criminal or fraudulent conduct,
relationship. A tniistn of contract law is that parties tire
though it might delay disclosure. For example, if communideemed to contract against the backdrop of existing law and
cations between a lawyer and client are made itt furtherance
public policy. Moreover, a foundational concept of contract
of a conspiracy to commit a crime, the communication is
law is that agreements that are contrary to public policy are
not protected by tile privilege.] I In cases in which criminal
unenforceable. Considerations of attorney-client privilege in
or fraudulent conduct by the client creates a danger oftuture
general and the crime-fraud exception in particular are not
harmn to tile public or a third pnrty, the attorney-client priviirelevant to the question of the reasonable expectations of a
lege will not protect client intitnation from ultimate disclient regarding the duty of contidentiality because no conclosure in court. Thus, clients who engage in on-going crimtract should be construed to undermine public policy. This
inal or frauditcn cunduct have no reasonable expeetation
line of contract analysis suggests that client expectations that
that the itformation at issue will be protected.
an on-going crime or fraud is protected by theduty ofconlidentiality may not be well- li.utdcd.
Legal ethics experts debate the issue whether the attorney-client privilege has bearing on the question of the
By its approval of the amendments noted above, tIhe
appropriate scope of the duty of confidentiality. As
Ilousc of Delegates took significant steps toward rejecting
Protbssor Hazard has noted, "tle two concepts [of confian absolutist version of confidentiality. The former Model
dentiality and the attortey-client privilege] are linked in
Rule 1.6 (which was modified by the I louse of Delegate's
policy and in practical consequences." 2 In tleir arlicle,
recent action) established a vision of confidentiality as a
Prd*'.ssional , rre(i un i.s K'ceptiems: Smuling V'
near absohtte when comparing ctients' interests with those
13
Zimwranan R'i.s'ited, Roger C. Cnnnion anti ori P.
of third parties and the public. The strength of the former
5553195

Tlihe House of Delegates took

significant steps toward rejecting

20
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nificant harm.19 Lawyers have significant training and skill in
applying factual tests. The ABA should trust them to apply a
balanced rule with permissive exceptions. It should invest
lawyers with discretion to judge the factual situations tlt justify disclosure of client information and it should allow
lawyers to assess all the interests in the balance when harm is
likely to flow from client wrongdoing.

Rule 1.6, which is still the rule in some jurisdictions, is
clear. Its prohibition against disclosure ofelient information
is broad and its exception to protect third parties is narrow.
It allows disclosure only when a mulli-faclor test is met: the
lawyer has knowledge that the client (not some other party)
is going to commit a crime that is likely to result in imminenl death or substantial bodily harm.17 The problem is that
the test pairs two imponderables: whether the most disastrous effect (imminent death or substantial bodily harm) will
ensue and whether the most reprehensible conduct (a crime)
will be utiliiycd and gives the lawyer no discretion to disclose client information unless these two imponderables
coalesce. These questions have no answers until a trial
establishes the necessary elements.

(3) RECOGNIZE THE PROFESSION'S RESPONSIBILITY TO
THE PUBLIC
If the legal profession is to retain the privilege of selfregulation, it must recognize its ultimate responsibility to
the public good. The drafters of the ABA Model Rules noted
the duty of lawyers and the legal profession to serve the
public interest, cautioning against allowing self-interest to
intluence the drafting of ethics rtles.
autonomyrcarie
carries
relative autonomy
prfession's relatiee
legal prfesin'
wi"The legle

The current Rule 1.6 retains elements of this absolutist

:,nnrct,| It lither reauires nnr erncoura,'ns dtisehosuirL' no

aprochowI-pernicious
neThee
prono
the client intent and provides
matter
how
sigmatter
no
interests,
tection for financial or property
nificant. Thus, in an important sense, the continued message
of the rule is that silence is golden.
(2) TRUST LAWYERS AS DECISION
MAKERS
By its inclusion of the recently passed
exceptions, the AIBA moved toward recog-

q.

.[

i
-

with itspecial responsibilities or self-government.
The profession has a responsibility to assure that its
regtlations are conceived in the public interest and not
.,

in firtherance ofparochial or self-inter-

ested
of tile bar."-(
ese concerns
cnersoDteha..

IS0010
hplicit in the ABA's assessment of its

ITihe current rule ties the lawyer's hands

a(both
nizing lawyers as trustworthy deiionnnakers. However, the ABA dido
enough in establishing this trust The still
N
too absolute tature of Model Rule 1.6 pro- 0
hibits the lawyer from exercising discretion in i significant number of situations. It leaves the
lawyer without the right to speak, even when a client crime
or fraud creates significant risks to others and the lawyer
could face liability from third parties ]or failing to warn
them of dangers.' h Thus, the current rule ties the lawyer's
hands and belittles the lawyer's role, making the lawyer
essentially a functionary without tile
power to draw distitctines based on significant risks known to him when the risks
threaten significant property or financial loss.

responsibility is the fact that legislatures

state and federal) possess the power to
regulate the conduct of persons within their
jurisdiction, including lawyers, so long as
de legislation stops short of violating the
separation of powers doctrine. Likewise,
lawyers cannot escape the reach ofthe common law by virtue
of rules of ethics. "The operation oflaw external to the law of

the lagoer's role ...
and belittles

The same analysis that led the House of Delegates to
empower lawyers in the situations of peril to life and bodily
harm also argues for empowering lawyers in situations

where the interests of third parties cletu ly outweigh the interests of a client who misuses the lawyer's services to commit
a crime or fraud resulting in substantial injury to others.
A possible justification for a categorical nile is that the
person applying the rle lacks the ability to make a reasoned
distinction of the principles that control. A nuanced rule is
harder to apply than a categorical one. 1'hus, when a decisionmaker laces the ability to distinguish between categories, a
categorical nile may be necessary. In tie case of tile lawyer's
duty of confidentiality, la%,ers apply the rule. However,
applying rules is the lawyer's role in life. One of the definitive skills of lawyers is the application of rules, whether simple or complex. Moreover, deference to the lawyer's decision
seems particularly appropriate in fact-specilie deicrminations
like those lawyers face in situations of peril or the risk ofsig-

I

lawyertig,--other law-will sometimes 'firre' firtherexeeplions regardless of what a disciplinary code might say."i
The Ilouse of Delegates embraced its role of serving the
public good by recralling the balance relating to confidentiality and disclosure in the exceptions it approved to Rule
1.6.
The reformulation if Model Rule 1.6 adopted by the
ABA I louse of Delegates in February 20102 strikes an appro-

priate balance of client interests with the interests of others
when life or bodily integrity weigh in the balance.
Problems remain, however, with regard to the interests
the House of Delegates rejected as insufficient to merit protection. Issues relating to client crimes or frauds that result
in significant financial or property loss arise in many areas
of law, perhaps most notibwly in environmental violations
and corporate law and finance. The Enron case may provide
examples of the difficult choices lawyers face when clients
engage in fraud or wrongful nondisclosure. In such circulnstances, clients who know well the constraints of confidentiality, may coerce lawyers to cover tip wrongdoing or to
facilitate a fraud on the public.
CONCLUSION
The possibility of renewed eltorts by members of the
louse to revert to the former rule on death and bodily harn
is radically out of step with the tradition of confidentiality in
the American legal profession and with tie rules of'profes-
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sional conduct adopted by most states. Such a reversion
would subject lawyers to the risk of liability to non-clients
harmed by client conduct that was known to the lawyer. lie
changes adopted by the House of Delegates offer important
corrections to Rule 1.6 and represent significant progress
toward addrcssing the interests ol' third parties. However,
the rejection of proposed subsection (h)(2) raises qucstions
oflproportiotality and fIirness. It also raises questions relating it)
the ABA's imprimatur of the regulation of lawyers
and the ABA's regard for the lawyers it represents.

7.

8.

ENDNOTES
*

The author thanks all firiends and colleagues who have discussed the ideas
presented here, especially Lucian Pera an
Professors Thomas D. Morgan, Rodney K. Smith, and Ellen
Y Sini.
i. Honorable E. NonnanVeWscy, the chair
of the Ethics 2000
Commission moved the House to consider adoption of the
amendments to the rules
as Ilouse Report 401.
2. The ABA is awaiting a final report by the
ABA Commission oil
Mullijurisdictional Practice, which is expected in May of 2002
befhire
completing worl on Model Rules 5.5 and 8.5 on unauthorized practice of law and disciplinary authority, choice of law,
3. The Commission proposed some change to virtually every
nile or comment to the rule.
4. The proposed revision to Model Rule 1.6 (in legislative formal) provided as follows:
RULE 1.6: CONFIDENTAIITY OF INFORMATION
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal infonnation relating to the representation of a client unless the client eetteni after eaznstl
l:d:oola,e::.e.. rti:.j. .: : i!A ::.e
gives
informed consent.
thedisclostre
* iimpliedly authorized inorder to carry out the
representation, tnd :tneep :n tnid in or the
disclosure
ip.
motted paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal **i infobmation rdnting tothe
rep
revtntation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the elzh frieie:
'mi:.g i er ntitat:l lte.
tha:mt
tloI,.;
yz R
i 1:10;'.
w:
' ISn
Fe:
%h illn ;
iff.=
fl' l.
reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily hatin; tm
(ZLt.0_-prevent dieclient from committing a crime or
isretsonhly cecilain to result in substantial
frand
that
iniury
to the financial interests or nionetty of another
andin_
rfligrance of which the client has used or is
usin the lawyer's service
(3) to prevent. mitigate or iectifv substantial initrv to the
inancial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted flora
the client's
commission of a crime
or fraud infurlh
.nc
Lich
the client has used the htwyer's serv ices:
(4) to secure lenal advice anbout the lawyer's conmnliance
.with jogRAs
t4-2)to establish a claim or dctlese n behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, it esltahlih a defense toia criminal charge or civil
claim agaitst the lawyer based upon conduct in which
the client was involved, or to respond to allegations i
atny proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation
of the client; or
order.
.o..comply with other law or a court
5. Proposed Model Rule 1.6 (b)(I). For full text, see footnote 4,
sttpra.
6. Itecatse the motion to delete subsection (b)(2) passed by a sub22

9.

10.

II.
12.
13.

stantial majority, the Commission withdrew from consideration
subsection (b)(3), a proposed exception that would have permintted disclosures to protect the interests of third parties. See
footnote 4, .nqura for ie full text of subsections (b)(2) and (3).
See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 158 (1986) (holding that
the dty of confidentiality does tinotrequire an attontey to
assist a client's fraud or to allow it to go unpunished).
See, e.g., Cox v.Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (stating
that free speech and assembly, "while funtdanental" to
democracy do not mean that people may "address a group at
aty public place and at any time"); American
Communicatiuns Ass'tt v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950)
(ooting "clear and present danger" exception to First
Amendment guarantee of free speech); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
Some members of the Ilouse of Delegates proposed retaining
Model Rule 1.6
in essentially its
current
form despite thefact
the long-standing tradition of the legal
system in a confidentiality rule-balancing client
interests against those of third
parties and the public.
Proposed subsection (b)(5) carries forward verbatim (b)(2)
from tie former rule, empowering lawycrs to protect their
own interests. Although this exception is sometimes called
the "Attorney Self-Defense Exception," it allows lawyers In
use client intbonation to establish a claim as well as a
defense. See, e.g., Daniel It. Fischel, l.awyerx and
Conidentiality, 65 U. Cui. L. REv. 1 (1998) (noting that the
legal profession qtaliftied the "ncar.absolutrc duty of confidentiality" by creating Lie "broad :0f-deiise' exceptint" as
a way of protecting lawyers).
See, e.g., United States v. Ilorvath, 731 F.2d 557 (1994).
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr,, UnderShelerof Confidentiali,,50
CAsa1 W.REs. L. REV. 1.3 (1999).
Roger C.Cramton and Lori 1. Knowles, l'mfrssiontal Secrecy
and iv Et'cepions: Spaulding it Zinmncrniun Revisited, 83
MtNN. L. REV. 63 (1998).

14. Id. at 107.
15.Id. it 106-07.
16. MODEL RULES OF PROrrssiONAL CONDUCT, Scope, parn. 17
(2002).
17. The exception tiprotect lawyers, by contast, presents a lib-

eral rule, allowing disclosure wlhen a lawyer reasonably
belteves it is ncccsary to establish a claim or defense on his
behalf. See discussio above.
18. Geotlrey Hazard made the point atthe August meeting oflthe
House of Delegates that lawyers are sied by third
parties who
believe that they acted iuconcert with clients who commit a
crime or fraud, noting that such clients are "rats." On the issae
of risks to lawyers for failing to disclose client information,
see generally Nathan Crystal, The Latntier': Dua,' to Disehose
Atlerial Fru't in Contract or Settlement Negotiaion., 87
KENTUCKY L.J. 1055 (1998-99)

19. Moreover, the Model Ititles acknowledge lawyer discretion in
the aundling of negotiatiots, case development snd other
areas that depend on lawyers to impose professional decisionmaking. Model Rule 1.2 notes that the client has ultimate
authority in deciding "objectives of representation," but that
the lawyer has authority in deterining the scope of the representation atd the means fbrachieving the client's objeclives. See Model Rule 1.2.
20. Mor.F.i,

Or.rvoF
sro tNa. 'ttmTP reattiblc, pa. 12

12002).
21. See I (.t:om:'REY
.'. 1AtAILI),
JR.. & W. Wit IAM 1101U.S,
'T'i
LAW OF LAWYrkrn o: A HANItnoK ONTMr. Mgpr . Rtit.r.s or

PROuSSIONAL CONDUcr 1.6:109, at 168.1-.2 1

TilE PROFESSIONAl .AWVER. SPRINGt 20112

HeinOnline -- 13 Prof. Law. 22 2001-2002

